Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War by Victoria Schoefield
Pretty balanced book about Kashmir between Indian and Pakistani position and also the struggle and challenges of the Kashmiris.
One must remember that Kashmiris did nothing to sabotage Indian position in any of the Indo-Pak wars.
In 1971, India had an opportunity to force Pakistan to accept Indian position in J&K, but didn’t.
Start of Kashmir agitation [p.18]
Kashmir was already like the proverbial powder keg. The spark was provided by a butler in the service of a European, Abdul Qadir, who, in July 1931, made a fiery speech calling for the people to fight against oppression. When he was arrested, crowds mobbed the jail, and several others were also arrested. There were further protests at which point the police fired on the crowd. Twenty-one people died. Their bodies were carried in procession to the centre of the town. Hindu shops were broken into and looted. The government retaliated with further arrests.
Hindu leaders visiting Kashmir but Muslim leaders did not go to Hyderabad or Junagadh [p.32]
The sub-continent was in the midst of a deep communal and political crisis. Yet both Nehru and Gandhi had insisted on visiting Kashmir. No Muslim leader visited the princely states of Hyderabad or Junagadh, nor did they visit Kashmir. Nehru and Gandhi were both known to be opposed to the maharaja making any declaration of independence. In addition the princes of Patiala, Kapurthala, and Faridkot from east Punjab visited Hari Singh in the summer, as well as the president of the Indian National Congress, Acharya J. B. Kripalani. Why so many visitors, all of whom must surely have had a vested interest in the advice they gave?
Kashmir’s independence for 73 days [p.40]
When the sub-continent became independent from British rule on 14-15 August, for the first time since Yaqub Chak submitted to Akbar in 1589, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was independent. It remained so for seventy-three days.
India did not sign the ‘standstill’ agreement [p.40]
On 12 August, in an exchange of telegrams, Hari Singh made a ‘standstill’ agreement with Pakistan. The objective was to ensure that those services which existed for trade, travel and communication would carry on in the same way as they had with British India. Pakistan therefore retained control of the rail and river links, which were used to float timber down the Jhelum river to the plains. India did not, however, sign a standstill agreement. V. P. Menon’s explanation is revealing given the interest Congress had shown in Kashmir in the months preceding independence: ‘We wanted to examine its implications. We left the State alone … moreover, our hands were already full and if truth be told, I for one had simply no time to think of Kashmir.’
Confusion about when Instrument of Accession was signed [p.58]
Junagadh to India [p.62]
Unlike Kashmir, the small state of Junagadh was surrounded by Indian territory and had no geographical contiguity with either wing of Pakistan, other than a 300-mile sea link. When the Nawab of Junagadh, Sir Mahabatkhan Rasulkhanji, acceded to Pakistan, the Indian government resisted his decision, calling for a plebiscite to determine the will of the people. Indian troops had invaded Junagadh at the end of October, at the same time as the Kashmir crisis erupted. On 7 November Sir Shah Nawaz Khan Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Junagadh, resigned, effectively accepting the Indian position pending the outcome of a plebiscite. It was eventually held in February 1948, when the majority Hindu population voted overwhelmingly in favour of India.
Muslim discriminated in employment in India [p.91-2]
[Shaikh] Abdullah had also become disillusioned with India’s secularism. Although he remained opposed to the two-nation theory, contrary to his earlier expectations, Pakistan was proving viable and there were some useful comparisons to be made. His speech in Jammu in 1952 pointed to specific areas of dissatisfaction: ‘I had told my people that their interests were safe in India, but educated unemployed Muslims look towards Pakistan, because, while their Hindu compatriots find avenues in India open for them, the Muslims are debarred from getting Government service.’ He also objected to discrimination against Muslims in the central departments as well. ‘Muslims were almost entirely debarred from working in postal services. Instead of striving for secularism, the officers of this department did just the opposite.’
Money for security but not for employment [p.114]
In 1968 he [Chief Minister G. M. Sadiq] met Prime Minister India Gandhi to explain the rising discontent in the state. In the presence of Inder Gujral, he told her: ‘India spends millions on Kashmir but very little in Kashmir. If I were to tell you that the law and order situation requires one more division of the army, you would send it, without the blink of an eye, but if I ask you to set up two factories, you will tell me twenty reason why it cannot be done and therefore what do our youth do?’
First armed action by Kashmiris [p. 115]
In September 1966 [Maqbool] Butt [of Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front (NLF)] clashed with the Indian army during an exchange of fire in Kunial village, near his hometown of Handwara; a co-worker was killed as well as an Indian army officer. As the group captain of what called the OID (Operations against Indian Domination) Butt and several others were charged with sabotage and murder.
JP on Kashmir [p.115]
… Jai Prakash Narain, Nehru’s old socialist friend and co-worker of the freedom movement had written to Mrs. Gandhi in 1966:
We profess democracy, but rule by force in Kashmir… the problem exists not because Pakistan wants to grab Kashmir, but because there is deep and widespread political discontent among the people… Whatever be the solution, it has to be found within the limitations of accession.
Plane hijacking [p.116]
After 1970 the security situation in the valley deteriorated. Although protests and demonstrations were common, a new phenomenon of systematic violence had emerged. The Indian authorities blamed the frequent acts of sabotage on a group known as Al Fatah, which supposedly was working in the interests of Pakistan. But neither its membership nor real allegiance was clear. In January 1971 an Indian airlines plane, ‘Ganga’, en route from Srinagar to New Delhi, was hijacked by two Kashmiri youths armed with a hand grenade (subsequently discovered to be made of wood) and a pistol. The plane was diverted safely to Lahore, the twenty-six passengers were allowed to leave and it was subsequently blown up. The hijacking created tremendous euphoria in Pakistan, where disappointment over the failure of the 1965 war still lingered. Crowds numbering hundreds of thousands gathered at Lahore airport. Maqbool Butt came into the limelight by meeting the hijackers and claiming responsibility for the hijacking.
First major act of violence [p.139]
In May 1987 the first major act of violence was perpetrated against Farooq Abdullah when his motorcade was attacked on the way to the mosque. Throughout the year sniper attacks became more common and, according to Tavleen Singh, there was evidence of increasing arms in the valley ‘some time in the summer of 1987, once the bitterness of the stolen election had sunk in.’
August 15, 1987 observed as black-day [p.140]
As India prepared to celebrate forty-one years of independence, anti-India slogans were raised in the valley. Pro-Pakistani supporters celebrated Pakistan’s independence day on 14 August, but India’s independence on 15 August was called a ‘black day’.
Occupation day [p.140]
On 27 October – the anniversary of India’s airlift into Srinagar in 1947- there was a complete strike on what the protestors were now calling ‘occupation day.’ Whereas in 1947 the Pakistanis were deemed the invaders whilst the Indian were greeted as liberators, by 1988 in the minds of the militants, the roles had been psychologically reversed.
Militants were the disappointed political workers [p.146]
Many of the militants were the disappointed political workers and traditional opponents of the National Conference in the 1987 elections. Young men aged between sixteen and twenty-five, they came from the towns of Srinagar, Anantnag, Pulwama, Kupwara and Baramula. Unlike their forebears who had campaigned for education and political rights in the 1930s, the majority were well-educated – doctors, engineers, teachers, policemen – who had become alienated by Indian government policies in New Delhi and lack of job opportunities. Their grievances were as much economic as political.
Jagmohan tenure in J&K [p.154]
Jagmohan’s tenure as governor lasted less than five months, during this period, the alienation of the valley against the Indian government became almost total.
By the time he left Kashmir, Jagmohan’s thinking had none of the qualities of the promised nursing orderly:
Every Muslim in Kashmir is a militant today. All of them are for secession from India. I am scuttling Srinagar Doordarshan’s programme because every one there is a militant … The situation is so explosive that I can’t go out of this Raj Bhavan. But I know what’s going on, minute by minute. The bullet is the only solution for Kashmir. Unless the militants are fully wiped out, normalcy can’t return to the valley.
Ashok Jaitely, a respected civil servant, who worked under Jagmohan, saw things differently: ‘What Jagmohan did in five months they (the militants) could not have achieved in five years.
Hazratbal stand-off [p.164]
In October 1993 the mosque at Hazratbal once more attracted international attention. Since the spring, the militants had been parading openly in the streets nearby. … By the autumn, the Indian government decided to take action. … Pakistan condemned the Indian action in surrounding the mosque as sacrilege and onlookers, both domestic and foreign, feared the outcome would be similar to the storming of the Golden Temple in Amritsar when the Indian army moved against Sikh militants in 1984.
The area was cordoned off, leaving about a hundred militants and some civilians inside the mosque. Negotiations took place and after thirty-two days, the militants surrendered. Both sides prided themselves on the outcome. ‘The militants did not let the Indians fire a bullet on the shrine,’ says [Azeem] Inquilabi. The Indian authorities took credit for the care and restraint used by the security forces at Hazratbal. ‘Food was sent in, so that neither the militants nor civilians starved,’ says [M.N.] Sabharwal [the director-general of the Jammu & Kashmir Police].
The image of Indian restraint was, however, undermined by the actions of the border security forces in Bijbihara when they shot at least thirty-seven unarmed demonstrators who were protesting against the siege of Hazratbal.
Pretty balanced book about Kashmir between Indian and Pakistani position and also the struggle and challenges of the Kashmiris.
One must remember that Kashmiris did nothing to sabotage Indian position in any of the Indo-Pak wars.
In 1971, India had an opportunity to force Pakistan to accept Indian position in J&K, but didn’t.
Start of Kashmir agitation [p.18]
Kashmir was already like the proverbial powder keg. The spark was provided by a butler in the service of a European, Abdul Qadir, who, in July 1931, made a fiery speech calling for the people to fight against oppression. When he was arrested, crowds mobbed the jail, and several others were also arrested. There were further protests at which point the police fired on the crowd. Twenty-one people died. Their bodies were carried in procession to the centre of the town. Hindu shops were broken into and looted. The government retaliated with further arrests.
Hindu leaders visiting Kashmir but Muslim leaders did not go to Hyderabad or Junagadh [p.32]
The sub-continent was in the midst of a deep communal and political crisis. Yet both Nehru and Gandhi had insisted on visiting Kashmir. No Muslim leader visited the princely states of Hyderabad or Junagadh, nor did they visit Kashmir. Nehru and Gandhi were both known to be opposed to the maharaja making any declaration of independence. In addition the princes of Patiala, Kapurthala, and Faridkot from east Punjab visited Hari Singh in the summer, as well as the president of the Indian National Congress, Acharya J. B. Kripalani. Why so many visitors, all of whom must surely have had a vested interest in the advice they gave?
Kashmir’s independence for 73 days [p.40]
When the sub-continent became independent from British rule on 14-15 August, for the first time since Yaqub Chak submitted to Akbar in 1589, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was independent. It remained so for seventy-three days.
India did not sign the ‘standstill’ agreement [p.40]
On 12 August, in an exchange of telegrams, Hari Singh made a ‘standstill’ agreement with Pakistan. The objective was to ensure that those services which existed for trade, travel and communication would carry on in the same way as they had with British India. Pakistan therefore retained control of the rail and river links, which were used to float timber down the Jhelum river to the plains. India did not, however, sign a standstill agreement. V. P. Menon’s explanation is revealing given the interest Congress had shown in Kashmir in the months preceding independence: ‘We wanted to examine its implications. We left the State alone … moreover, our hands were already full and if truth be told, I for one had simply no time to think of Kashmir.’
Confusion about when Instrument of Accession was signed [p.58]
Junagadh to India [p.62]
Unlike Kashmir, the small state of Junagadh was surrounded by Indian territory and had no geographical contiguity with either wing of Pakistan, other than a 300-mile sea link. When the Nawab of Junagadh, Sir Mahabatkhan Rasulkhanji, acceded to Pakistan, the Indian government resisted his decision, calling for a plebiscite to determine the will of the people. Indian troops had invaded Junagadh at the end of October, at the same time as the Kashmir crisis erupted. On 7 November Sir Shah Nawaz Khan Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Junagadh, resigned, effectively accepting the Indian position pending the outcome of a plebiscite. It was eventually held in February 1948, when the majority Hindu population voted overwhelmingly in favour of India.
Muslim discriminated in employment in India [p.91-2]
[Shaikh] Abdullah had also become disillusioned with India’s secularism. Although he remained opposed to the two-nation theory, contrary to his earlier expectations, Pakistan was proving viable and there were some useful comparisons to be made. His speech in Jammu in 1952 pointed to specific areas of dissatisfaction: ‘I had told my people that their interests were safe in India, but educated unemployed Muslims look towards Pakistan, because, while their Hindu compatriots find avenues in India open for them, the Muslims are debarred from getting Government service.’ He also objected to discrimination against Muslims in the central departments as well. ‘Muslims were almost entirely debarred from working in postal services. Instead of striving for secularism, the officers of this department did just the opposite.’
Money for security but not for employment [p.114]
In 1968 he [Chief Minister G. M. Sadiq] met Prime Minister India Gandhi to explain the rising discontent in the state. In the presence of Inder Gujral, he told her: ‘India spends millions on Kashmir but very little in Kashmir. If I were to tell you that the law and order situation requires one more division of the army, you would send it, without the blink of an eye, but if I ask you to set up two factories, you will tell me twenty reason why it cannot be done and therefore what do our youth do?’
First armed action by Kashmiris [p. 115]
In September 1966 [Maqbool] Butt [of Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front (NLF)] clashed with the Indian army during an exchange of fire in Kunial village, near his hometown of Handwara; a co-worker was killed as well as an Indian army officer. As the group captain of what called the OID (Operations against Indian Domination) Butt and several others were charged with sabotage and murder.
JP on Kashmir [p.115]
… Jai Prakash Narain, Nehru’s old socialist friend and co-worker of the freedom movement had written to Mrs. Gandhi in 1966:
We profess democracy, but rule by force in Kashmir… the problem exists not because Pakistan wants to grab Kashmir, but because there is deep and widespread political discontent among the people… Whatever be the solution, it has to be found within the limitations of accession.
Plane hijacking [p.116]
After 1970 the security situation in the valley deteriorated. Although protests and demonstrations were common, a new phenomenon of systematic violence had emerged. The Indian authorities blamed the frequent acts of sabotage on a group known as Al Fatah, which supposedly was working in the interests of Pakistan. But neither its membership nor real allegiance was clear. In January 1971 an Indian airlines plane, ‘Ganga’, en route from Srinagar to New Delhi, was hijacked by two Kashmiri youths armed with a hand grenade (subsequently discovered to be made of wood) and a pistol. The plane was diverted safely to Lahore, the twenty-six passengers were allowed to leave and it was subsequently blown up. The hijacking created tremendous euphoria in Pakistan, where disappointment over the failure of the 1965 war still lingered. Crowds numbering hundreds of thousands gathered at Lahore airport. Maqbool Butt came into the limelight by meeting the hijackers and claiming responsibility for the hijacking.
First major act of violence [p.139]
In May 1987 the first major act of violence was perpetrated against Farooq Abdullah when his motorcade was attacked on the way to the mosque. Throughout the year sniper attacks became more common and, according to Tavleen Singh, there was evidence of increasing arms in the valley ‘some time in the summer of 1987, once the bitterness of the stolen election had sunk in.’
August 15, 1987 observed as black-day [p.140]
As India prepared to celebrate forty-one years of independence, anti-India slogans were raised in the valley. Pro-Pakistani supporters celebrated Pakistan’s independence day on 14 August, but India’s independence on 15 August was called a ‘black day’.
Occupation day [p.140]
On 27 October – the anniversary of India’s airlift into Srinagar in 1947- there was a complete strike on what the protestors were now calling ‘occupation day.’ Whereas in 1947 the Pakistanis were deemed the invaders whilst the Indian were greeted as liberators, by 1988 in the minds of the militants, the roles had been psychologically reversed.
Militants were the disappointed political workers [p.146]
Many of the militants were the disappointed political workers and traditional opponents of the National Conference in the 1987 elections. Young men aged between sixteen and twenty-five, they came from the towns of Srinagar, Anantnag, Pulwama, Kupwara and Baramula. Unlike their forebears who had campaigned for education and political rights in the 1930s, the majority were well-educated – doctors, engineers, teachers, policemen – who had become alienated by Indian government policies in New Delhi and lack of job opportunities. Their grievances were as much economic as political.
Jagmohan tenure in J&K [p.154]
Jagmohan’s tenure as governor lasted less than five months, during this period, the alienation of the valley against the Indian government became almost total.
By the time he left Kashmir, Jagmohan’s thinking had none of the qualities of the promised nursing orderly:
Every Muslim in Kashmir is a militant today. All of them are for secession from India. I am scuttling Srinagar Doordarshan’s programme because every one there is a militant … The situation is so explosive that I can’t go out of this Raj Bhavan. But I know what’s going on, minute by minute. The bullet is the only solution for Kashmir. Unless the militants are fully wiped out, normalcy can’t return to the valley.
Ashok Jaitely, a respected civil servant, who worked under Jagmohan, saw things differently: ‘What Jagmohan did in five months they (the militants) could not have achieved in five years.
Hazratbal stand-off [p.164]
In October 1993 the mosque at Hazratbal once more attracted international attention. Since the spring, the militants had been parading openly in the streets nearby. … By the autumn, the Indian government decided to take action. … Pakistan condemned the Indian action in surrounding the mosque as sacrilege and onlookers, both domestic and foreign, feared the outcome would be similar to the storming of the Golden Temple in Amritsar when the Indian army moved against Sikh militants in 1984.
The area was cordoned off, leaving about a hundred militants and some civilians inside the mosque. Negotiations took place and after thirty-two days, the militants surrendered. Both sides prided themselves on the outcome. ‘The militants did not let the Indians fire a bullet on the shrine,’ says [Azeem] Inquilabi. The Indian authorities took credit for the care and restraint used by the security forces at Hazratbal. ‘Food was sent in, so that neither the militants nor civilians starved,’ says [M.N.] Sabharwal [the director-general of the Jammu & Kashmir Police].
The image of Indian restraint was, however, undermined by the actions of the border security forces in Bijbihara when they shot at least thirty-seven unarmed demonstrators who were protesting against the siege of Hazratbal.
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